By the early 1890s, several state courts had held that liberty of contract was constitutionally mandated. Some legal commentators harshly criticized these opinions, whereas others opined that maximum hours laws, truck acts, laws requiring payment of wages at certain intervals, and other laws intended to protect workers all violated the right to liberty of contract.
The Supreme Court gradually accepted the notion that liberty of contract was an enforceable constitutional right under the due process clause. In Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895), the Court, speaking through Justice David Brewer, offhandedly declared that "generally speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of contract."
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) However, just a year later, in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), a seven-to-two majority of the Court placed significant restrictions on the scope of the liberty of contract doctrine. In the process of upholding a maximum hours law that applied only to underground miners, the Court declared that reasonable health or safety measures were within the states' police powers, even if they interfered with freedom of contract. The Court also suggested that it should generally defer to the state's view that it is operating within its police power. A series of Court decisions upholding various labor regulations followed, with only Justices Brewer and Peckham regularly dissenting.
Much to almost everyone's surprise, a five-to-four majority of the Court applied the liberty of contract doctrine to invalidate a New York maximum hours law for bakers in the notorious case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) . In an opinion by Justice Peckham, the Court held that in the absence of evidence that the hours law protected public health, or that baking (like mining in Holden) was an especially unhealthful field in need of specific regulation, The most controversial issue of the day, however, was the status of labor reform, and at least through the early 1920s the Court rarely interfered with labor or health regulations claimed to be within the states's police power. In the decade after Lochner, the Court upheld almost every state labor reform law that came before it, including laws banning child labor; regulating the hours of labor of women employees; making mining companies liable for their willful failure to furnish a reasonably safe place for workers; mandating an eight-hour day for federal workers or employees of federal contractors; and many others.
By 1917, the liberty of contract doctrine seemed virtually moribund. The Court upheld four very controversial labor reforms: workers' compensation laws, a federal law that not only limited railroad workers to an eight-hour day but also fixed wages at the level the workers had received when working longer hours, a minimum wage law for women, and a maximum hours law for all industrial workers. (1) "those dealing with statutes fixing rates and charges to be exacted by businesses impressed with a public interest."< (2) "statutes relating to contracts for the performance of public work." , and Benjamin N. Cardozo. By 1934, a majority had formed willing to broadly expand the "affected with a public interest" doctrine to the point where just about any regulation of prices was constitutional. In that year, the Court upheld a New York law fixing the price of milk, defining "affected with a public interest" as meaning no more than "subject to the exercise of the police power," which includes all businesses (Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 [1934] ).
In the Court faced a challenge to legislation requiring that an optician may not fit or duplicate lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist. Under this law, without a prescription an optician could not even sell a pair of replacement frames to someone whose frames broke. The Court held that it did not matter if the law's requirements were in fact rationally related to its stated objectives or to the objectives asserted by the state in its briefs before the Court. Rather, so long as it "might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct" a problem, a law was constitutional. A hypothetical rationale, in other words, never even considered by the legislature that passed the law or argued to a court, was sufficient to render a law nonarbitrary and constitutional.
In Despite these decisions, lower federal courts will occasionally hold that a law that restricts freedom to pursue an occupation is so clearly arbitrary or unreasonable as to fail the rational basis test. For example, in Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) , the Sixth Circuit held that a law that allowed only licensed funeral directors to sell caskets violated the due process clause. Some state courts, meanwhile, never retreated as far from Lochner as the Supreme Court did, and still occasionally invalidate economic regulations that go too far in restricting economic freedom as violations of their states' constitutions. In general, however, freedom of contract is almost entirely unprotected under modern constitutional law. 
